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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tinuing support of public education, safeguarded from infringement
by lesser interests." The Congressional mandate is effectuated and
the trust funds protected from diversion by the strict and unqualified
requirement of compensation at full appraised value. The Court's
decision allows maximum beneficial use by the state of trust lands,
while insuring that the high place Congress accorded to public educa-
tion in the hierarchy of competing public policies is not endangered.
MODIFICATION OF IRREVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUSTS
WITH REMAINDER INTEREST IN SETTLORS' HEIRS
Plaintiff executed a spendthrift trust reserving to herself an income
interest for life. Upon her death corpus was to be paid over as she ap-
pointed by will, or in default of appointment to "such of her next of
kin... as by the law in force in the District of Columbia at the death
of the... [settlor] shall be provided for in the distribution of an
intestate's personal property therein." The trust by its terms was
irrevocable, and there was no reserved power to alter, amend, or
modify. Settlor sought modification of the trust, invoking the doctrine
of worthier title in an attempt to construe the future interest as a re-
version in herself, rather than a remainder in her next of kin. As both
sole beneficiary and settlor, she claimed the power to revoke or modify
the trust at will. On appeal from summary judgment for defendant-
trustee, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed.
Held: The doctrine of worthier title is rejected in the District of
Columbia; therefore settlor-beneficiary cannot modify the trust with-
out consent of remaindermen; however, when a trust instrument cre-
ates a remainder interest in a settlor's heirs or next of kin, a guardian
ad litem representing unborn and unascertained heirs may bargain
with the settlor for trust modification and consent thereto on their
behalf.' Hatch v. Riggs Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 559 (D.C. Cir. 1966).2
'The New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act was introduced in the 61st Congress
as H.R. 18166. Definite concern was expressed that the state receive adequate return
from the disposition of the trust lands for support of public education. See H.R.
REP. No. 152, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1910). During the act's passage there were
substitutions and amendments to strengthen the trust provisions. See 45 CoNG. REc.
8487 (1910) ; S. REP. No. 454, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1910). When the bill came
before the entire Senate, the chairman of the Senate Committee of Territories
stressed the importance of the trust provisions in providing continuing support of
public education. See Remarks of Senator Beveridge, 45 CONG. REc. 8227 (1910).
'The sole issue in the principal case was whether the court would apply the
doctrine of worthier title as a means of trust modification. Affirmance of the judg-
ment for the trustee was without prejudice to future modification attempts by settlor
based on the court's dicta.
216 CATHOLIC U.L. R v. 239; 66 COLUm. L. REv. 1552; 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 166; 51
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1228.
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Any irrevocable trust can be terminated or modified with consent of
settlor and all beneficiaries.' Such consent is impossible to obtain when
there is a remainder interest in the heirs or next of kin of a living
person, because all beneficiaries cannot be ascertained. 4 The doctrine
of worthier title, molded by judicial construction into a rebuttable
presumption against remainders in a settlors' heirs,' has often been
employed as a means of terminating such trusts. While rejecting the
doctrine of worthier title the court in the principal case suggested that
guardian ad litem representation of a part of the class of heirs' would
satisfy the requirement of consent where such interests were present.
Pursuant to the court's proposal, a settlor would first obtain the
consent of his heirs presumptive at the time of the action. A guardian
ad litem would be appointed to represent the class of additional per-
sons, both living and unborn, who might be heirs at settlor's death.
The settlor, heirs presumptive, and guardian ad litem could then ne-
gotiate a modification agreement.' The court suggested that a settlor's
general testamentary power of appointment over trust corpus might
be released as consideration for remaindermen's consent to limited
corpus invasion. The court stated that appointment of a guardian ad
litem was within a court's inherent power without legislative authoriza-
tion, and expressed the view that settlors and life tenants of trusts
established largely for their benefit should not, simply because re-
mainder interests in heirs or next of kin are present, be disadvantaged
in efforts to modify such trusts.
' See 361 F.2d at 564; Fowler v. Lampher, 193 Wash. 308, 75 P.2d 132 (1938);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 338(1) (1959); 3 ScOrr, TRUSTS §338 (2d ed.
1956).
'See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 340(1), comment d (1959); 3 SCOTT, op.
cit. supra note 3, at § 340.
1 The inter vivos branch of the doctrine of worthier title was first expressed as
a rule of construction in Doctor v. Hughes, 255 N.Y. 304, 122 N.E. 221 (1919). For
an excellent discussion of the history of the doctrine in American courts see Verrall,
The Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Questionable Rule of Construction, 6 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 371 (1959).
For discussion of the desirability of retaining the doctrine of worthier title as
a rule of construction see Browder, Future Interest Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1255
(1960); Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 0Ma..
L. REv. 133 (1949); Verrall, supra; Comment, 47 Nw. U.L. REv. 597 (1952).
'The appointment of guardians ad litem to represent unborn or unascertained
beneficiaries in trust litigation is not uncommon. E.g., Leonardini v. Wells Fargo
Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9, 280 P.2d 81 (1955); Petition of
Wolcott, 95 N.H. 23, 56 A.2d 641 (1958) ; Hardy v. Bankers Trust Co., 137 N.J. Eq.
352, 44 A.2d 839 (1945).
" The proposition that a settlor and other beneficiaries may bargain in a trust
termination situation is not novel. See MacMillan v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,
221 N.C. 352, 20 S.E.2d 276 (1942), where termination was allowed pursuant to an
[ VOL. 42: 903
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A settlor's general testamentary power of appointment can be re-
leased" by a contract with the remaindermenY However, such a re-
lease, when given in consideration for permission to withdraw trust
assets, might be challenged as a "fraud on the power"--an attempt
by the donee of a special appointive power to benefit a non-object of
his power.' The donee of a general testamentary power of appoint-
ment, although he may appoint to his estate, may not appoint to him-
self inter vivos. If such a donee releases his power of appointment
as consideration for the default takers' consent to trust corpus in-
vasion, he is employing his power to obtain a portion of the appointive
property he could not obtain by valid exercise of his power. This seems
no different than an attempted benefit of a non-object by the donee of
a special power of appointment, and consequently is a violation of the
donor's intent in granting the power. However, when the donee of the
power is also the settlor, as in the principal case, he can in that capa-
city consent to diversion of the power from its original purpose without
valid objection.
The requirement of guardian ad litem consent to modification intro-
duces a limiting factor into the court's proposal. A guardian ad litem
stands in a fiduciary relationship to those he represents," being with-
agreement whereby settlor was to pay the only other beneficiary part of the trust
fund as consideration for consent to trust termination.8
.All powers of appointment are releasable except powers in trust. 2 SIuEs &
SixnH, FUTURE INTERESTS 525 (2d ed. 1956). Cf., RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 335,
comment a (1948 Supp.).
Thirty states have statutes providing for release of powers of appointment.
BROWDER & WELLmAN, FAMILY PROPERTY SETTL=ENTS 256 (1965). E.g., WASH.
REv. CODE § 64.24.010 (1958) :
Any power, which is exercisable by deed, by will, by deed or will, or otherwise,
whether general or special, other than a power in trust which is imperative, is
releasable, either with or without consideration, by written instrument signed
by the holder thereof and delivered as hereinafter provided, unless the instrument
creating the power provides otherwise.
I See District of Columbia v. Lloyd, 160 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; RESTATMENT,
PROPERTY § 336(3) (1940) ; 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 333 (1966).
State release statutes commonly provide methods of effectuating a release. E.g.,
MicH. STAT. ANN. § 26.154(3) (1957):
A release of a power ... is effective when the donee thereof signs an instrument
in writing evidencing an intent thereby to make the release and delivers, or
causes to be delivered, the instrument, either:
(a) To an adult person who might take any of the property which is subject to
the power; or
(b) To any trustee or co-trustee of the property which is subject to the power;
or
(c) To the register of deeds in the county in which any of the property is
located or in which the donee resides, and in such case the same shall be
recorded by the register.
"See Matter of Carroll, 274 N.Y. 288, 8 N.E.2d 864 (1937); REsTATEMENT,
PROPERTY §§ 351-54 (1940) ; SniEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 157-59 (2d ed. 1966).
U Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.D.S.C. 1961); Note, 45 IowA
L. REv. 376, 386-87 (1960).
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out power to consent to any modification not in the best interests of
the unborn and unascertained beneficiaries. 2 If, however, a settlor
holds a general testamentary power of appointment over trust corpus,
as in the principal case, the remaindermen's interest is contingent upon
nonexercise of that power. The settlor's release would consequently
make the remaindermen's interest more secure, and a guardian ad
litem's consent to limited corpus invasion as consideration for this
bargain should be binding. The propriety of the guardian giving such
consent, however, will depend upon the circumstances of each case,
such as a degree of invasion requested in proportion to total trust
assets, probability that the power would or would not be exercised,
etc. Lack of definite criteria for determining whether a particular
modification will benefit remaindermen places a difficult burden on
the guardian ad litem. Because of potential personal liability, he is
likely to be very conservative in consenting to trust modification.
If the settlor's heirs presumptive in the principal case qualified as
representatives under the doctrine of "virtual representation,"' their
consent to any modification proposal would bind the balance of the
class, rendering guardian ad litem appointment unnecessary. Under
the doctrine of virtual representation, persons whose interests were
created by limitation to the "heirs" or "next of kin" of a living person
may be represented by one or more of the presumptive takers under
such limitation.' 4 This doctrine is premised upon the theory that the
See Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9,
280 P.2d 81, 87 (1955) ; Wogman v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 123 Cal.
App. 2d 657, 267 P.2d 423, 429-30 (1954); Deal v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,
218 N.C. 483, 11 S.E.2d 464, 468 (1940).
A guardian ad litem might be liable for any damage sustained by those whose
interests he represents caused by culpable omission or neglect. Dixon v. United
States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.D.S.C. 1961); In re Jaeger's Will, 218 Wis. 1, 259 N.W.
842 (1935).
The guardian's fiduciary obligation, however, does not necessarily require that
the remaindermen benefit from modification in a monetary sense. In Hardy v.
Bankers Trust Co., 137 N.J. Eq. 352, 44 A.2d 839 (1945), a guardian ad litem was
allowed to consent to trust modification involving corpus invasion where there was
no gain to remaindermen, on the ground that the purpose of the trust would have
been defeated if modification had been denied.
Qualification of "representatives" under this doctrine is governed by four rules:
(1) [Tlhe representatives of the class must have the same interest in the contro-
versy as the class represented, (2) the representatives must have no interests in
the suit antagonistic to the interests of the class, (3) there must be no fraud or
collusion, nor may there be a friendly suit, and (4) the court must find in its
judgment that the class was fairly and adequately represented.
Comment, 11 Sw. L.J. 210, 211 (1957). See RESTAT=NT, PRoPERTy §§ 183, 185
(1936) ; Srm.Es, op. cit. supra note 10, at 104.
"See RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 181(b) (1948 Supp.); Snms, op. cit. supra
note 10, at 103. The impossibility of joining all persons who may become heirs or
next of kin of a living person by some combination of future events, and hardship
in operation of the normal requirement that all living persons be joined as parties,
[ VOL. 42: 903
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self-interest of a representative party will redound to the benefit of
other members of the represented class.1" However, there are ad-
vantages in employing guardian ad litem representation to supplant
this doctrine. Appointment of a guardian relieves the trial court of the
burden in determining a representative's qualifications. 16 A guardian
may be appointed and a modification action initiated when there are
no existing members of a class capable of representing its interests."
Furthermore, under the doctrine of virtual representation a representa-
tive party is under no personal obligation to promote actively the
interests of his class."8 A lack of adequate representation may not be
apparent in the original suit, and the settlement may be subsequently
attacked." On the other hand, guardians ad litem are bound by their
fiduciary obligation to protect actively all interests they represent, and
although their settlements may later be challenged, this should occur
less frequently. Also, the complainant may attempt to hold the guard-
ian personally liable for any damage caused by his breach of fiduciary
duty2° in lieu of an attack upon the settlement. Although the doctrine
of virtual representation would theoretically apply in trust modifica-
tion actions, the advantages and additional safeguards of guardian ad
litem representation render it more desirable.
Statutes in a few American jurisdictions present an alternative
method of handling the problem of consent by unborn or unascer-
tained contingent remaindermen. They provide essentially that a set-
tlor can terminate a trust upon consent of all persons "beneficially
interested," and define that class for consent purposes to exclude heirs
warrants recognition of this form of representation. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 181,
comment a (1948 Supp.).
The Restatement further provides that a person in being may be represented in a
judicial proceeding if he is one of the permissible objects of a power of appointment,
and the donee of the power is joined as a party. Id. at § 181(c). The reasoning is
that "the possibility of an object taking is so completely within the power of the
donee, that it is reasonable to expect that any such object will receive all the
protection which his interest merits, through the joinder of the donee." Id. at § 181
comment a. Although this may be valid in other contexts, when the donee-settlor's
power of appointment is general, or when a donee-income beneficiary holds a special
power of appointment and the permissible objects are also default takers, the interest
of the donee seeking trust modification is adverse to the interests he would represent.
Under such circumstances representation by the donee directly conflicts with the policy
of protecting all beneficial interests.
'Roberts, Virtual Representation in Actions Affecting Future Interests, 30 ILL. L.
REv. 580, 581-82 (1936).
a See note 13 supra.
t' See Peoples Nat7I Bank v. Barlow, 235 S.C. 488, 112 S.E.2d 396 (1960).
's See Roberts, supra note 15, at 591.
29Siss, op. cit. supra note 10, at 104; Note, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1001, 1002-03
(1935).
'Cf. Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798 (W.D.S.C. 1961); In re Jaeger's
Will, 218 Wis. 1, 259 NAV. 842 (1935).
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and next of kin,2 or to exclude all persons not in being.2 Such statutes
alleviate the harshness of the common law requirement of consent, but
sacrifice protection of unborn and unascertained interests.3
In the principal case the trust was created primarily for the settlor's
own benefit. It seems overly rigid to allow the presence of a con-
tingent remainder in the settlor's next of kin to block trust modifica-
tion, especially where their remainder interest could be defeated by
exercise of a general power of appointment. The court's proposed
modification procedure will promote alienability and flexibility in
trusts, and will afford relief to the unfortunate settlor who by over-
sight or ignorance24 placed his property in irrevocable trust with a
remainder interest in his or some other living person's heirs. With
guardians ad litem bargaining in behalf of unborn or unascertained
remaindermen, jeopardy to their interests is minimized. Furthermore,
adoption of such a procedure eliminates the need for reliance on the
doctrine of worthier title, whose operation has proven unsatisfactory in
several respects,25 as a means of terminating irrevocable trusts with
remainder interests in unborn or unascertained beneficiaries.
" N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 23 (McKinney 1962); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 181
(McKinney Supp. 1966).
'MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 108 (1957) ; OKLA .STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.41 (1963);
Wisc. STAT. § 231.50 (Supp. 1966). A North Carolina statute provides that a grantor
of a voluntary trust with a future interest in a person or persons not determined
until the happening of a future event may at any time before the happening of the
contingency revoke the grant of the interest to such person or persons. However,
the operation of this statute has been severely curtailed by amendment. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 39-6 (1950).
Three states have statutes which allow court authorization of corpus invasion,
not provided for in the trust instrument, where there is insufficient income for
support or education of an income beneficiary. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 15-a(McKinney Supp. 1966); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 103-a (McKinney Supp. 1966);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.2 (Supp. 1966) ; Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 231.21 (1957).
A recent English statute allows court protection of unborn or unascertained
interests by providing that a court can consent to a trust modification on behalf of
unborn or unascertained beneficiaries if the court is satisfied that such modification
would be for their benefit. Variations of Trusts Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53.
A detailed discussion of the operation of, and variations among, these statutes is
beyond the scope of this note. For additional commentary see Scott, Revoking a
Trust: Recent Legislative Simplification, 65 HARv. L. REv. 617 (1952); Verrall,
77e Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Questionable Rule of Construction 6 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. (1959) ; Comment, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 376 (1965) ; 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 678 (1951);
26 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 201 (1951).
'However, where a rule requiring consent of only living beneficiaries is
employed, the interests of those who consent will in many cases be identical to the
interests of those excluded-resulting in what amounts to virtual representation of
the excluded interests.
Voluntary trusts may be rescinded or reformed only upon grounds of fraud,
duress, undue influence, or mistake. RESTATEIENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 333 (1959).
'Although one of the major arguments supporting retention of the doctrine of
worthier title as a rule of construction is that it effectuates the intent of the settlor,
it has been suggested that the rule more often results in defeating that intent, and
that its application has led to strained and inconsistent interpretations of trust
[ VOL. 42 : 903
